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Abstract— This paper focuses on the design and implementa-
tion of a high-quality and high-throughput true-random number
generator (TRNG) in FPGA. Various practical issues which we
encountered are highlighted and the influence of the various
parameters on the functioning of the TRNG are discussed. We
also propose a few values for the parameters which use the
minimum amount of the resources but still pass common random
number generator test batteries such as DieHard and TestU01.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are at the very core of cryptographic
algorithms. They are used to generate either the public /
private key pair in asymmetric algorithms, or the shared secret
/ initialisation vector in symmetric cyphers. The ability of
an adversary to predict the random numbers used, voids the
security of the cypher. In fact, the only cypher whose security
is proven to be perfect (one time pad) relies on the fact that the
random number source is perfectly uniform and unpredictable.
Random number generators are of two types. The first one,
pseudo-random number generators (PRNG), are the ones in
which a person who designed the system, or has access to its
internal state can predict the next random number. The system
is a deterministic Finite State Machine, whose evolution can
usually be described based on an arithmetic formula which
determines its transition from a given internal state to another
state, while outputting a random number based on a portion
of the state. They have the advantage of having high speeds
and some of them are cryptographically secure. However,
all of them require an initial state (also called seed), which
determines the sequence of numbers which will be generated.
The importance of well seeding a pseudo-random number
generator has recently been highlighted in a Debian security
vulnerability[1].
The second type of random numbers generators are true-
random number generators (TRNG), whose output cannot be
predicted, not even by the person who designed them. They are
usually based on sampling some kind of physical phenomenon
(such as noise) which has a lot of randomness. Although one
would be tempted to use only TRNGs in cryptography, their
smaller throughput prohibits this, so they are commonly used
to seed PRNGs.
FPGAs are becoming a popular choice for implementing
cryptographic devices, due to the fact they represent the middle
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ground between the flexibility of the microprocessor and the
speed of an ASIC. They allow creating high-throughput cryp-
tographic devices while at the same time making it possible to
change or improve the underlying algorithms, should a security
flaw be discovered.
Many papers [3][6][7][8][9] have explored the possibility of
implementing TRNGs in FPGAs, motivated by the avoidance
of additional hardware, and the impossibility to intercept the
data stream between the TRNG and the actual cryptographic
implementation. While all of them claim to obtain good-
quality TRNG, few mention explicitly the methods involved
in transforming a hardware which is supposed to work pre-
dictably into a source of entropy.
This paper elaborates on the design and implementation of
the TRNG principle presented by Martin and Stinsonin in
[6] and highlights a few practical issues encountered while
implementing a high-quality TRNG based on it. We identified
a few generic parameters, whose influence on the TRNG will
also be presented in this paper. The ultimate purpose is to
enable the reader to easily implement this TRNG on a low-
cost FPGA development board, such as one featuring a Xilinx
Spartan 3E.
II. PRINCIPLE
Like many TRNG implemented in FPGA, this design is
based on sampling jitter. In essence, due to various noise
sources such as that induced by the power supply but also
by nearby components, the behaviour of ”demanding a 0 or
1” from the transition slope of an output is unpredictable. This
is caused by the fact that each technology defines a low (L)
threshold, which is the upper limit for voltages which represent
a logic 0, and a high (H) threshold which is the lower limit
of logic 1. Output behaviour between these two values is not
well defined. This can be modelled as if the output of the
component would have a perfectly vertical slope, but the time
of the transition is unknown and can range from the beginning
until the end of the real slope (figure 1).
In order to produce jitter, TRNGs employ one or more ring
oscillators (RO) (figure 2). These are composed of a ring of
odd number of inverting elements and an arbitrary number
of delaying elements. The simplest RO is composed of a
single inverter and a buffer. The output of a RO is never
stable and does transitions from 0 to 1 and back to 0 with
a frequency given by the propagation delay of the constituting
elements. Due to the above described phenomena, the period
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Fig. 1. The Jitter Model
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Fig. 2. Ring Oscillator (RO)
of an oscillation will not be constant, because it will vary by
a small amount each time. This is the manifestation of jitter
and the source of entropy which our TRNG will collect.
Our first attempt was to create a TRNG based on [3],
which uses one RO to sample the output of the other RO. We
appreciated this approach due to the fact that the whole stream
before the post-processing phase is random (although it might
be biased a little bit). We also favoured this design, because, if
there is some kind of predictable jitter (such as coming from
the power source), both ROs are influenced the same way
which should cancel out at the sampler. However, we found
that putting this design into practice is very challenging. The
two ROs have to be nearly identical, which requires manual
placing and routing. Even after achieving that, the design
proved to be very sensitive to other components in the FPGA.
At the time of this writing we have been able to create a
TRNG which outputs very good numbers on a serial interface,
but have been unable to obtain good quality random numbers
at the TRNG’s highest speed.
Therefore, we chose to implement [6] which uses multiple
ROs whose outputs are XOR-ed. A flip-flop whose clock
is driven by a fixed frequency will sample the combined
output of the ROs. The obtained stream will hit both jitter
zones (our source of entropy) and flat zones (which are
highly predictable). A post-processing phase is required which
consists in a resilience function[2]. In essence, the function
takes an m-bit input, out of which n-bits are known to be
random (but we can’t determine which ones) and outputs n-
bits which are known to be random. For n = 1, the simplest
resilience function is to xor all the input bits. Suppose all but
one bits are deterministic, but the probability of a 0 or 1 value
of one bit are equal, the output of the xor will also have equal
probability of being 0 or 1.
III. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
A. Creating ROs in VHDL
Our first goal was to create a VHDL component which
would implement a ring oscillator with a parametrised length.
We first studied what resources are available in the FPGA to
create ring oscillators. The main building block of the FPGA,
the CLB are the only ones that actually contain logic, and
are interconnected by a network of routing wires. The CLB
contains a LUT, an invertor and a memory element which can
be either used as a latch or as a flip-flop. The output of latch
/ FF goes directly out of the CLB into the interconnection
network. Two CLBs are grouped together in a slice, however
in order to connect the output of one latch / FF to the other
CLB in the same slice, the wire has to exit the slice, go
through the interconnection network and reenter the CLB.
From Xilinx’s reports we noticed that the main delays in
FPGA come from latches and routing. The inverter induces
a negligible delay. Another interesting thing we noticed is
that during the mapping phase, a GLOBAL LOGIC1 signal is
created which provides logic ”1” for all the CLBs that require
it.
Having the knowledge above, we chose to have a single
inverter at the beginning of the chain and a variable number of
latches as delay components (like in figure 2). A single inverter
allows us to create ROs which both even and odd number of
latches. By default Xilinx’s synthesis tool optimises out all
but one latch, due to the fact that they seem redundant from
its viewpoint. In order to prevent this, we must set the ”keep”
attribute[10] of the d bus which interconnects the latches:
attribute keep : string;
attribute keep of d : signal is "true";
This tells the synthesis and mapping tool that we want the
individual d signals not to be absorbed into a CLB. Each of
them must pass through the interconnection network, which
forces the tools to map the redundant latches to CLBs.
To make sure that the inverter does not add more delay, we
added the not keyword directly into the port map of the first
latch, without assigning it a signal. This has the effect that the
inverter and the first latch are mapped to the same CLB.
B. Sampler
We chose to give the whole TRNG circuit the same interface
as the one used by [3], to which we added an input clock
signal (figure 3). The BitReady output signal is high when
the TRNG has a new random bit, which will appear at the
RandomBit pin. When the external circuit has stored the
random bit, it will acknowledge the TRNG by rising the
ReadAck pin.
Although our particular TRNG is synchronous, all three
signals are assumed to be asynchronous, both inside the TRNG
and the external circuitry that connects to it. We took this
decision for two purposes: first, we wanted to be able to use
a RO’s output as the sampling clock, which would make the
TRNG truly asynchronous, and secondly, we wanted to used
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Fig. 3. TRNG Scheme
the very same design to test future TRNG, which might be
asynchronous in nature.
C. Resilience Function
Contrary to the design employed by others, we chose as
the resilience function a simple XOR of 2r-bits (where r
is a generic parameter). We did this because we feared that
using a more complex resilience function may hide possible
defects in our TRNG, which we obviously want to avoid.
Moreover, some resilience functions (such as cyclic codes)
are implemented using shift registers and XORs which might
act as PRNG. We specifically want to test how well the TRNG
works with minimal post-processing. Using the TRNG to seed
a PRNG (although a possibly weak one) is against the purpose
of our paper.
D. High-throughput Measurements
It was very important for us to validate the TRNG at its
maximum speed. We feared that the output interface from the
FPGA to the computer (where the random bits are collected
and analysed), whether RS232 or USB, would do additional
sampling of the (possible partially) random stream. This would
return more optimistic results compared to the TRNG being
used only inside the FPGA.
In order to achieve this, we created a design which would
first fill a 16 Kbit BlockRAM with TRNG output, then transfer
this to the output interface (figure 4). We think that this is very
close to how a TRNG would be used in a FPGA cryptographic
application: the cypher gets values from the entropy buffer and
while the algorithm proceeds, the TRNG fills back the entropy
buffer.
The design is able to handle burst transfers from the TRNG.
The data-in port of the RAM is directly connected to the
TRNGs output. The control signals of the address counter and
the write-enable port of the RAM are directly connected to
the BitReady port of the TRNG, provided the FSM is in
the FillRAM state. A separate circuit is used to drive the
ReadAck port of the TRNG which sets it to 1 at the very
next clock rising edge, exactly when the RAM has stored the
random bit.
The FSM which controls this circuit has 8 states (figure 5).
The first, Idle is the state in which the FSM is set im-
mediately after reset. Transition is made immediately to the
PrepareFillRAM state, which resets the address counter.
Next, the FillRAM state allows the counter to increase and
the RAM to store values when a new random bit is ready.
The FSM stays in this state until the RAM is filled (i.e. the
RAM address counter wraps around). The next three states
(ReadRAM, ShiftIn, CheckSR) serialise the bits stored
in the RAM into a byte for being transmitted to the UART
module. The same counter is used to control the address of
the RAM, but it is only incremented in the ShiftIn state.
Finally, when a byte is complete (i.e. the Serialiser sets
the ready port to 1) the FSM will wait for the UART to
complete the previous transmission (WaitUART), then dis-
patch the data (UARTSend). If there is more data to transmit
(i.e. RAM address counter is non-zero) then the FSM will
transition to the ReadRAM state, serialising the next byte.
If the whole contents of the RAM has been transmitted, it
will be freshly filled with random numbers, by jumping to the
PrepareFillRAM state.
IV. TUNING THE TRNG
A very important practical aspect of the TRNG is to know
the influence of its generic parameters on the quality of its
output. We also wanted to test practically what is the smallest
number of FPGA resources which are required for this TRNG.
We used the DieHard[5] and the TestU01[4] (NIST, Rabbit and
Alphabit battery) suites to test the quality of the TRNG output.
We only considered parameters for which the output of the
TRNG passed all tests, i.e. all DieHard p-values are different
from 0 or 1, and TestU01 prints ”All tests were passed”.
All files which we downloaded had at least 10 MB, due
to limitations in DieHard. Interestingly, the TestU01 library
proved to be a lot more sensitive than DieHard.
The proposed TRNG has the following generic parameters:
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number of ring oscillators (n), length of ring oscillators (l),
sampling frequency divisor (2d) and resilience function input
width (2r).
The first two aspects in which we were interested is the
throughput and the amount of resources this design uses. The
throughput can be easily computed as the output rate of the
TRNG is the input clock frequency, divided first by the clock
divider, then the resilience function. The formula is:
b =
f
2r ∗ 2d (1)
where f is the input clock frequency of the TRNG and b is
the throughput in bps.
The amount of resources can also be easily estimated. Each
RO uses l CLBs. The xor stage is synthesised as a tree of
LUTs. Due to the fact that the slice of a Spartan 3E device
contains 4-bit input LUTs the number of CLBs is
⌈
n−1
3
⌉
. The
clock divisor uses approximately d4 CLBs. The counter uses
about r4 CLBs, while the and stage at its output uses
⌈
r−1
3
⌉
.
The other components (sampler FF, resilience XOR and FF,
acknowledge circuit) use 3 CLBs. Therefore the total number
of used CLBs (C) is:
C = l +
⌈
n− 1
3
⌉
+
d
4
+
r
4
+
⌈
r − 1
3
⌉
+ 3 (2)
During our experiments we concluded that the quality of
the output random bit stream increases with the increase of
d, r and n. As the number of ring oscillators (n) increases
and because the ring oscillators don’t have the exactly same
frequency, the signal after xoring them will be composed of
much more jitter than flat zones. This means that the sampler
will return much more non-deterministic bits compared to the
amount of deterministic bits. The more input bits the resilience
function has the more non-deterministic bits will be xored with
the deterministic bits, which in effect will increase the chance
of the TRNG to output a truly random bit.
Regarding the clock divider, if d is too small (even compara-
ble to the frequency of the ring oscillators), the sampler tends
to hit the same flat zone or return the same non-deterministic
bit several times. The resulting correlated bits can of course
be eliminated in the resilience stage, provided that r is large
enough. We can clearly see that the well-known throughput
vs. resources conflict also holds in case of this TRNG.
We haven’t found any significant influence of l on the
quality of the random numbers. This might be due to the fact
that while each delay element increases the output period of
the ring oscillators, it also increases the amount of jitter, so
the percentage of the jitter after the sampling stage remains
roughly the same. Although one is tempted to use ring oscil-
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR HIGH QUALITY TRNG
d r n l
throughput
(Kbps)
0 2 20 3 12500
0 3 10 3 6250
2 2 10 3 3125
5 3 5 3 195
lators with the minimum length, we recommend to use l ≥ 3
to make sure that the system does not remain without jitter in
extreme conditions such as sudden temperature variations.
In our experiments the parameters values presented in table I
created a TRNG which passed all tests, while minimizing the
number of ring oscillators. Please note that in case one wants
to be absolutely sure that the TRNG will output high-quality
random numbers, higher values should be used for r or, if
bandwidth is an issue, n.
V. SPEEDING UP THE TRNG
FPGAs are becoming large enough to allow massive pipelin-
ing of arithmetic operands and compute one result per clock.
In some applications it might be desirable to generate random
numbers at the maximum frequency of the FPGA. In the above
design, both the resilience function (characterised by r) and
the sample clock divider (d) lower the frequency of the TRNG.
While we could set d to zero, so that the sampling clock is set
to maximum, we can never set r to zero, while at the same
time obtain good quality random numbers.
First solution which would come to one’s mind is to use
multiple parallel TRNGs and multiplex their outputs. Suppose
the sample clock divider is equal to zero, each TRNG would
output one bit each 2r cycles. This means that we would
need 2r TRNGs for generating one random bit on each FPGA
clock. While this solution would surely work (due to the fact
that by interleaving truly random streams one obtains another
truly random stream), we wanted to find a design that would
minimise the resource utilisation.
Our idea is that we require the resilience function because
not all our bits are sampled from jitter. The same would apply
if we would XOR bits coming from different samplers. This
way, we would save 2r counters, FFs and AND gate and
replace them with one big XOR.
Indeed, we have practically validated the fact that good qual-
ity random numbers are generated using the above concept, for
8 samplers and 20 ROs / sampler. Interestingly, the number of
samplers required is equal to the number of bits which enters
the resilience function in the design presented in figure 3.
Note however, what for the mentioned values, we used 160
ROs, eight times more. An interesting question is whether this
number of ROs could be used to generate a random bit stream,
without using a resilience function (d = 0 and r = 0 in
figure 3). We have practically shown that this is not possible,
as explained in [7]. In essence, the probability of sampling
a random bit increases with the number of ROs, but never
reaches 1. The small percent of the resulting correlated bits is
enough to make the TRNG fail quality tests.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown how a simple yet of high-
quality and high-throughput TRNG can be implemented on
a low-end Xilinx Spartan 3E FPGA and presented the main
implementation issues one might encounter. We have also dis-
cussed the various parameters of the TRNG and the influence
they have on the design. We believe that this paper has paved
the way to implementing secure cryptographic applications in
low-end FPGAs, without requiring any external component.
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